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LIST OF Mb PfrfiTIPS
The parties to this litigation are as follows:

Commercial

Security Bankf a Utah banking corporation hereinafter referred to in
this Brief as "CSB", and Smithfield Livestock Auction, Inc.f a Utah
corporation, hereinafter referred to in this Brief as "Smithfield".
No other party has been involved in this litigation at any time.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether appellant CSB as a collecting bank of the checks

issued by Smithfield to said William C. Erickson, was bound by the
endorsement instructions contained on the reverse side of the
Smithfield checks payable to William C. Erickson onlyf and without
CSB as a co-payee thereonf thereby constructively or actually
acquiescing in the sale of the cattle upon which CSB held a security
interest and thereby waiving CSB's claim for conversion against
Smithfield; and
2.

Whether Smithfield is liable in conversion to CSB for the

sale of livestock upon which CSB held and claimed a lien by virtue
of the filing of a U.C.C. 1 Financing Statement thereon, due to its
failure to make CSB a co-payee upon the checks issued to William C.
Erickson upon sale by Smithfield.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by CSB against Smithfield seeking damages
for conversion arising from the sale of livestock consigned to
Smithfield for sale by William C. Erickson, a borrower from CSB.
The claim arises by virtue of the failure of Smithfield to remit the
proceeds of sale to CSB pursuant to CSB's perfected security
interest in the livestock.
On June 8 f 1982, CSB's predecessor in interest, Bear River
State Bank, made a $50f000.00 loan to William C. Erickson and Susan
S. Erickson, husband and wife.

The loan was secured by two (2) John

Deere farm tractors, a trust deed on a parcel of land, and a lien on

all of Erickson1s livestock "now owned or hereafter acquired," the
livestock lien being perfected by a UCC-1 filing with the Secretary
of State along with an executed farm products security agreement.
In addition to being borrowers of CSB, the Ericksons also maintained
a joint checking account with the Bank*
The Erickson loan remained in a current payment status until
April of 1983 at which time it became delinquent.

Previouslyf

however, between the dates of June 15, 1982 and October 14 f 1982,
William C. Erickson took his livestock in small lots to the
Smithfield, a licensed livestock auction house in Cache County, on
twelve (12) separate occasions between those dates, for sale.

The

Auction sold the livestock and issued its checks on each of the
twelve (12) sales to William C. Erickson as the sole payee thereon,
net of Smithfield's $7.00 per head commission; neither CSB or Bear
River State Bank were the drawee bank on the Smithfield checks paid
to Erickson.

William C. Erickson deposited each of the twelve (12)

checks into his checking account at Bear River State Bank within two
or three days of receipt of each check.

Each of the Smithfield

checks contained a pre-printed statement on the reverse side which
stated as follows:
"In executing my endorsement of this check I do sell to the
Smithfield Livestock Auction, Inc., the herein described
Livestock and guarantee that I am the owner of said Livestock
and that said Livestock are clear of all mortgage liens or
encumbrances. If Livestock are mortgaged, mortgagee's
endorsement or release of mortgage is required. Please
endorse below."
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During 1982, Smithfield had no procedures in place to
investigate or verify whether the livestock brought to it for sale
was subject to a prior security interestf although at least one of
Smithfield's principals assumed as a matter of experience that over
90% of livestock going through the auction was subject to a lien.
Upon default on the Erickson loan in April of 1983, CSB
repossessed and sold one (1) tractor, failed to locate the other
tractor, foreclosed the trust deed, and attempted to locate the
livestock with no success.
deficiency balance remained.

Following sale of the collateral, a
CSB subsequently learned of the facts

of the livestock sale and brought its suit on April 29, 1985
claiming damages for conversion against Smithfield.
The case was tried to the Courtf the Honorable Venoy
Chirstoffersonf sitting without juryf on October 15 r 1986.

Prior to

commencement of the trial, the Court considered CSB's Motion in
Limine which had been filed in writing prior to the trial date.

The

court failed to grant or deny the Motion in Limine at any time
during the proceedings.

Following the close of CSB's case in chief,

defendant moved for a Directed Verdict, no cause of action.

That

motion was granted, and written Findings of Factf Conclusions of
Law, and Judgment of Dismissal were entered by the Court on November
24 f 1986.

CSB filed its Notice of Appeal on December 3, 1986.
STATEMENT QF FACTS

Appellant asserts that the following are the facts relevant
to a determination of this appeal.
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1.

Respondent, CSBf is the successor in interest to Bear

River State Bankf which was merged with Commercial Security Bank on
or about March 31, 1984. (Finding of Fact 2; Record on Appeal at
157) .
2.

Defendant, Smithfield Livestock Auction, is a Utah

corporation doing business in Cache County, State of Utah and is a
licensed livestock auction agent. (Finding of Fact 2; Record on
Appeal at 157) ;
3.

On or about June 8, 1982, William C. Erickson and Susan

S. Erickson (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Ericksons"),
for valuable consideration, executed and delivered to CSB a certain
promissory note in the original principal sum of $50,000.00 together
with interest accruing as stated therein.(Findings of Fact 3; Record
on Appeal at 157) ;
4.

In furtherance of said loan transaction and as security

therefore, Ericksons, on or about June 8, 1982, executed and
delivered to the CSB a certain security agreement wherein and
whereby they pledged as security for the note all livestock "now
owned or hereafter acquired", including but not limited to 33
Holstein cows, 67 Holstein heifers, 16 Holstein steers and 13
Holstein calves (hereinafter referred to as the "livestock"), along
with certain other specified items of farm equipment. (Finding of
Fact 4; Record on Appeal at 157);
5.

As a part of the same loan transaction with CSB.

Ericksons executed and delivered to CSB a certain U.C.C. 1 Financing
Statement to the collateral recited in the security agreement, which
financing statement was filed with the office of the Utah Secretary
i
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(

of State of June 23, 1982 as File No. 880544. (Finding of Fact 5;
Record on Appeal at 157) ;
6.

During all times relevant to this actionf Smithfield was

conducting a livestock auction and marketing business located in
Cache County, State of Utah. (Finding of Fact 6; Record on Appeal at
157-158);
7.

From at least June 8 f 1982 until May 1983, Ericksons kept

and maintained a checking account in their joint names at CSB's
predecessorf Bear River State Bank, at Tremonton, Utahf account
number 124301740-57-71917-1. (Finding of Fact 7; Record on Appeal at
158);
8.

Between the dates of June 15f 1982 and October 14f 1982,

inclusivef Ericksons consigned livestock for sale to Smithfield.
Said sales were conducted on twelve (12) separate occasions and
following each salef Smithfield issued to Erickson its check
representing the gross amount of the proceeds realized from the
auction of the livestock on that particular occasion less a
commission of $7.00 per head sold.

All of said twelve (12) checks

issued by Smithfield to Erickson bore William C. Erickson as the
sole payee thereon and all were deposited for collection to the
Erickson checking account at Bear River State Bank by Erickson.
Specificallyf the date of the checkf the check number, and amount of
the check and the date deposited by Erickson are as follows:

-5-

Check Date

Che<?k Number

Amount of Cher*

Date Deposited

July 1, 1982

16396

$ 1,761.40

July 2, 1982

July 1, 1982

16373

1,336.85

July 2, 1982

July 8, 1982

16588

381.81

July 15 r 1982

16757

1,744.40

-indecipherable-

July 29, 1982

17108

2,544.10

July 30, 1982

August 5, 1982

17217

1,022.34

August 6, 1982

August 5, 1982

17266

979.70

August 6, 1982

August 12, 1982

17430

2,589.10

August 13, 1982

August 22, 1982

17598

1,339.40

August 23, 1982

August 26, 1982

17778

2,189.10

August 26, 1982

September 30, 1982

18620

1,892.56

October 1, 1982

October 14, 1982

18920

3,099.42

October 15, 1982

TOTAL:

July 14, 1982

$20,869.18
(Finding of Fact 8; Record on Appeal at 158-159);

9.

The twelve (12) above specified checks issued by

Smithfield to William C. Erickson contained on the back side thereof
the following printed endorsement instructions: "In executing my
endorsement of this check, I do sell to the Smithfield Livestock
Auction Inc. the herein described livestock, and I guarantee that I
am the owner of said livestock and that said livestock are clear of
any mortgages, liens or encumbrances.

If livestock are mortgaged,

mortgagees endorsement or release of mortgage is required.

Please

endorse below" (Finding of Fact 10; record on Appeal at 159-160);
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10. Each and every one of the said twelve (12) checks from
Smithfield to Erickson bore only the endorsement of William C.
Erickson and of no other person or party whatsoeverf and all of the
same were collected by CSB'spredecessorf Bear River State Bank and
no deduction or offset was exercised by Bear River State Bank or CSB
against the checking account into which said checks were deposited
and collected (Finding of Fact 10; Record on Appeal at 159-160);
11. Each of the above specified checks was issued by
Smithfield to William C. Erickson within 3 or 4 business days of the
date of the livestock sale upon which each such check was issued
(Finding of Fact 11; Record on Appeal at 160);
12. During the year 1982f Smithfield had no procedures or
methods in place by which to investigate or verify whether livestock
which was brought to it for sale was subject to a U.C.C. 1 filing on
behalf of a secured creditor with the Utah Secretary of State
(Finding of Fact 12; Record on Appeal at 160);
13.

During the year 1982, due to its knowledge and

experience in the industryr Smithfield assumed as a matter of course
that at least 90% of all livestock brought to it for sale was
subject to a lien or mortgage of some kind (Finding of Fact 12;
Record on Apeal at 160);
14. The loan obligation of June 8, 1982 from CSB to Ericksons
remained in a current and non-delinquent status until April of 1983
at which time it became delinquent (Finding of Fact 13; Record on
Appeal at 160);
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15. On Hay 10 f 1983f Ericksons filed a joint petition for
relief under Title 11, United States Code in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, case number 83M-Q3 05.
CSB's predecessor in interest. Bear River State Bankf was named as a
creditor in that proceeding.

Smithfield was not named as a creditor

in that proceeding at any time.

Ericksons were discharged in

bankruptcy under Chapter 7 by order of the United States Bankruptcy
Court dated and entered August 2, 1983 (Finding of Fact 15; Record
on Appeal at 160-161);
16.

Pursuant to the default of Erickson under the note of

June 8 f 1982 and pursuant to the security agreement executed
thereon, CSB's predecessor, Bear River State Bankf obtained relief
from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court and exercised against the collateral
pledged thereto by Erickson.

Specificallyf CSB received a payment

of $1,500.00 from Erickson in consideration of one of two John Deere
Tractors subject to the security agreement which CSB was unable to
locate; CSB repossessed and sold the second John Deere Tractor which
was the subject of the security agreement to Golden Spike Equipment
company and realized the sum of $3,150.00; CSB foreclosed the deed
of trust on certain property which was additional security for the
loan and bid in at sale thereof the sum of $9,000.00; and CSB was
unable to locate the livestock which was the subject of the security
agreement (Finding of Fact 16; Record on Appeal at 161);
17. Following execution against the above specified
collateral, there was an indebtedness due, owing and unpaid on the
June 8, 1982 note in the total sum of $15,919.66 as of March 14,
1984 (Finding of Fact 17; Record on Appeal at 161);
-8-

18. Smithfield has not claimed and did not have at any time a
perfected interest in and to any livestock owned by Erickson
(Finding of Pact 18; Record on Appeal at 161);
19. In the livestock industryf the fair market value of
livestock is what said livestock will bring at sale at any
particular time in a regular market therefore and the Smithfield
Livestock Auction is a regular market for livestock such that its
sale of livestock would reflect the fair market value of the same at
the time and place of sale (Finding of Fact 19; Record on Appeal at
161-162);
20. CSB filed its Complaint in the instant case on or about
April 28 r 1985 claiming that the sale by Smithfield of cattle owned
by Erickson and subject to the security interest of CSB was an act
of conversion entitling CSB to relief against Smithfield in the sum
of the fair market value of the cattle at the time and place of
sale.
21. Trial on the merits was held before the First Judicial
District Court, in and for Cache County, State of Utah, the
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersenf Judge, presiding, sitting without
jury, on October 15, 1986.

Following the close of CSB's case in

chief, Smithfield moved for a directed verdict which was granted by
the court and a judgment of dismissal, no cause of action was
entered pursuant to the granting of the motion for directed verdict
(Record on Appeal at 166-167).
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CITATION OF STATTITF.fi.

RULES AND REGULATION
RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT

CSB relies upon the following statutes, rules and regulations
in support of its argument:

UTAH CODE ANN. 70A-4-105 (d)
UTAH CODE ANN. 70A-3-205
UTAH CODE ANN. 70A-9-307
UTAH CODE ANN. 70A-4-203

Copies of the full text of each of the above-cited statutes
or rules are contained in Appendix "A" to this Brief.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
An examination of the legal basis of the trial court's ruling
shows the manifest error in the application of the law to facts
which were essentially undisputed between the parties.

Although the

trial court did not make specific conclusions that CSB's claim of
conversion against Smithfield was sustained, the entire ruling was
rendered upon the basis that the endorsement instructions on

-10-

Smithfield checks created a waiver by CSB of its conversion claim;
it would then necessarily follow that the trial court found merit in
CSB's conversion cause of action lest there would have been nothing
to which the waiver could apply.
Notwithstanding the trial court's failure to make specific
findings and conclusions as to CSB's conversion claims, CSB admitted
evidence and testimony into the trial record sufficient to make a
prima facie case of conversion against Smithfield, upon which the
trial court was obligated to make a conclusion sustaining the claim
as pleaded; the Findings of Fact entered by the trial court contain
each and every element of a conversion cause of action.

Several

cases from other jurisdictions directly on point uniformly hold that
a livestock auctioneer is liable to a secured lender for conversion
of livestock in which the security interest is held when the
auctioneer sells the secured property without remitting the proceeds
to the secured party unless waiver or acquiescence is shown*

The

evidence showed that CSB held a perfected security interest in the
livestock of borrower William C. Erickson, and that Smithfield sold
the secured livestock at auction and failed to remit the proceeds to
CSB.
The trial court chose to find and conclude that CSB waived
its conversion claim against Smithfield based upon a certain
endorsement instruction contained on the reverse side of twelve (12)
Smithfield checks made payable to William C. Erickson.

CSB was not

a co-payee on the checks, or any of them; and endorsement, by its
terms, purports only to exact from the endorser/payee a promise that
the livestock consigned to Smithfield was free of liens, and if not,
-11-

that the endorser/payee would secure the release thereof.

CSB, not

being a party to the instruments, was certainly not subject to the
endorsement instructions on any theory of contract.

However, the

trial court ruled that since William C. Erickson deposited the
checks into his checking account at CSB, and that since the
endorsement instructions alluded to the fact that a livestock sale
had taken place, CSB was on notice of the sale, on notice of the
source of funds, and on notice that it was not a co-payee on the
checks; and that by failing to set off against the checking account,
CSB acquiesced in the sale and waived its conversion claim.

This

ruling is a clear error in the application of the law as UTAH CODE
ANN. Section 70A-4-203, as amended (which statute was argued to the
Court) exempts collecting banks from the effect of endorsement
instructions between the drawer of a check and the bank's depositing
customer and payee, referred to in the Code as the bank's "immediate
transferor".

The official comments to the Uniform Commercial Code

set out the sound practical reasons for this exemption explaining
that "banks ordinarily handle instruments, especially checks, in
bulk, and have no practicable opportunity to consider the effect of
restrictive endorsements".

The trial court, when confronted with

Section 70A-4-203, chose to make an exception thereto from whole
cloth by concluding that 70A-4-203 did not apply where the
collecting bank is also the lienholder on the collateral in
question.

This exception to the application of 70A-4-203 finds no

justification in the statutory language, the official comments, or
the case law interpreting the same.
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Because the trial court entered its judgment of dismissal, no
cause of actionf on defendant's Motion for directed verdict
following the close of CSB's case in chieff the trial court was
required to examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the
losing partyf CSBf and if there is a reasonable basis in the
evidence and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom that would
support a judgment in favor of the losing partyf a directed verdict
cannot be sustained.

A directed verdict is only appropriate when

the trial court is able to concludef as a matter of law, that
reasonable minds would not differ on the facts to be determined from
the evidence presented.

By ruling on the defense motion as it did,

the trial court removed from the defendant the burden it had to
prove that it had no knowledge of CSB's security interest in the
livestock, that the security interest was or was not duly perfectedf
why CSB was not a co-payee on the checks, and whether CSB acquiesced
in the livestock sale.

Smithfield's auction managerf Newell Kingf

testified in CSB's case-in-chief that he presumedf as a matter of
experiencef that over 90% of the livestock which goes through the
Smithfield Livestock auction is "mortgaged".

For purposes of the

defendant's motion for directed verdict, Mr. King's testimony and
the lack of defense evidence meeting the prima facie elements of
conversion presented a reasonable basis in the evidence, and
inferences to be drawn therefrom, that would support a judgment in
favor of CSB.

It is not the province of the trial court to weigh or

determine the preponderance of the evidence when faced with a motion
for directed verdict;

yet the trial court improperly did so in the

instant case in granting the defense motion.
-13-

Clearly a reasonable

inference could have been drawn from the evidence admitted i n
p l a i n t i f f ' s case i n c h i e f ,

taking the same in the l i g h t most

favorable to the p l a i n t i f f ,
plaintiff,

that p l a i n t i f f

that p l a i n t i f f was e n t i t l e d t o the

was e n t i t l e d t o the r e l i e f

sought in

its

Complaint, requiring reversal of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g in favor
of S m i t h f i e l d ' s Motion for Directed Verdicts
LEQAL ARSPHPNT
POINT I
LEGAL BASIS OF THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING
In order to fully frame the manifest error committed by the
trial Court in making its ruling, it is important to understand the
legal basis upon which that ruling was made.
The Conclusions of Law made and entered by the trial Court
are, of course, the legal conclusions in the record from which this
Court must draw its opinion as to the correctness thereof.
Appellant does not intend to go outside of the Conclusions of Law
entered by the Court but would additionally cite to portions of the
transcript of the Judge's oral ruling from which the Findings and
Conclusions were drawn to further illustrate the lower court's
manifest misunderstanding of the law as it applies to the issues
presented by this case (a copy of the decision portion of the
official trial transcript is contained in Appendix "B" to this
Brief).
Initially, it is important to note that the Court concluded
that CSB held a perfected security interest in and to all livestock
owned or after acquired of William S. Erickson and Susan C. Erickson
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by virtue of a security agreement and U.C.C. 1 Financing Statement
filed with the office of the Secretary of State on June 23, 1982.
(Conclusion of Law No. 1; Record on Appeal at 162; Trial Exhibits
PI, P2, and P3). Further, the Court concluded that the loan
obligation of William C. and Susan Erickson to CSB reached a
delinquent status in April of 1983 and that there was an amount
owing of $15,919.66 (Conclusion of Law No. 3; Record on Appeal at
162-163).
As the transcript and the record on appeal indicate,
particularly the Complaint and the Answer of Smithfield thereto, the
parties were in agreement as to most of the basic operative facts of
the case.

The assignment of error comes primarily in the

application of law to those facts.
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
rendered by the trial court, it appears that a clear case of
conversion was made by CSB; however, the court held that CSB was
estopped from asserting the claim of conversion and that it waived
the same by accepting for collection Smithfield checks made payable
to William C. Erickson deposited in his checking account at CSB's
predecessor, Bear River State Bank, with an "endorsement" which the
Court held notified CSB, as the livestock lienholder of what was
occuring.

Particularly, the Court concluded in the Conclusions of

Law, particularly Conclusion No. 5 (Recond on Appeal at 163-164) , as
follows;
"Plaintiff is estopped from asserting its claim of
conversion against the defendant and has waived its claim of
conversion as the plaintiff was the mortgagee of the cattle
which was sold by the Smithfield Livestock Auction and was in
addition the collecting bank on the said Smithfield Livestock
Auction checks paid to William C. Erickson by virtue of Mr.
- 15 -

Erickson's deposit of those checks into his account at the
plaintiff bank, which the plaintiff bank collected for Mr.
Erickson into his account without exercising a right of set
off thereagainst; and further, the plaintiff is charged with
constructive notice of the endorsement instructions on the
back side of each check and knew or should have known from
said endorsement instructions that its loan debtor, Mr.
Erickson, was selling livestock through the Smithfield
Livestock Auction which was subject to its security interest
therein and that said checks, pursuant to said endorsement
instructions, required endorsement of any mortgage holder and
that the payee, William C. Erickson, guaranteed to the
Smithfield Livestock Auction under the terms of said
endorsement instructions that said livestock was free and
clear of any mortgage, lien or interest of any other party.
The court concludes that the plaintiff was on notice of and
bound by the terms of the endorsement instructions on the
back of each of the Smithfield Livestock Auction checks
notwithstanding the provisions of Utah Code Annotated
70A-4-2Q3, as amended, inasmuch as the plaintiff was the
mortgage holder of the cattle in question in addition to
being the "collecting bank" as provided in said statute and
instructions on said checks."
The trial Court's ruling on the record (see Appendix "B"
hereto) is also illustrative of the position being taken in making
the ruling.

Commencing at Page 108, Line 5 of the Trial Transcript

herein, the Court held as follows:
" . . . but I think the endorsement is important on the back
of that check. What that endorsement is saying, or at least
I interpret it as saying, is that Smithfield Livestock
Auction, who puts that endorsement on there, is saying "I am
to my bank authorizing them to pay to Mr. Erickson X number
of dollars provided he signs the endorsement on the back
guaranteeing that there are no mortgages and that if there
are any mortgages, then the release of the person who has the
mortgage is required for this check to be any good at all. I
think that is what the restrictive endorsement said.
Now I think this is where the waiver comes in, or I mean the
estoppel comes in, is that the bank, Bear River Bank, now
successor the plaintiff, takes in the check knowing what the
restrictive endorsement is and says that this is for a sale
of livestock and you are to pay out the money or collect, In
this case being the collecting bank, and give the money to
Mr. Erickson by placing it in his account, only if the
livestock is mortgaged that you have the mortgagee's
endorsement on it. That is what he is telling them.
-16-

Now they are telling the person who knows they are mortgaged,
and I say that they then, if they give Mr. Erickson the money
knowing that they nave to put their endorsement on it for
there to be any liability on the check by Smithfield
Livestock Auction . • • and for that reason I don't think
that they can come now and say, 'heyf we were ignorant of
these checks coming in for payment of cattle and giving Mr,
Erickson the money for him to do what he wants with and not
protecting ourselves on our mortgage,' when they had the
mortgage restrictions on the back of the check and I think
that is the most important part
." (emphasis added).
The court made it clear in the transcript that the basis of
the ruling of no cause of action wasf in fact, the conclusion that
CSB was subject to the endorsement instructions.

Commencing at page

110 of the Trial Transcript, Line 23, and in response to counsel's
question regarding the same, the dialogue proceeded as follows:
MR. SHIELDS: So my understanding of the court's ruling
of No Cause of Action is based upon the restrictive
endorsement. We have had other assertions but that's the —
THE COURT: Yeah. I think 70A-4-203 would protect you if
you did — if you were not the mortgagee on what the
endorsement says the restriction is for and ignored it. With
notice that this is being — that money is given out and
"we're collecting it to put in your account on the basis of
selling our mortgaged property." Now how can you come back
and say, "because at that time we didn't protect ourselves
even with notice," and say, "hey, this is Mr. Erickson, this
money is for the sale of cattle we have mortgaged and so we
want the money," . . .
In short, the Court held CSB subject to the endorsement on
the Smithfield checks by virtue of the fact that Erickson deposited
his checks into his checking account at CSB.
With the basis of the Court's ruling of no cause of action
having been established in the record, it is now in the logical
sequence of analysis to bring into focus the manifest error
committed by establishing

two further points of law; first, that
-17-

Smithfield was clearly liable in conversion to CSB and second, that
no estoppel or waiver can be established as a defense to the
conversion liability as CSB was not subject to the endorsement in
questionf or any endorsement for that matterf under these of
circumstances.

These two points will be covered in that sequence

under point three (III) and four (IV) below.

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED BY GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
DIRECTED VERDICT AS IT FAILED TO CONSTRUE THE
EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF,
UNDERTOOK TO WEIGH AND DETERMINE THE PREDONDERANCE
OF EVIDENCE AT THAT STAGE OF TRIAL, AND FAILED TO
AFFORD PLAINTIFF THE BENEFIT OF REASONABLE INFERENCES
TO BE DRAWN FROM THE EVIDENCE.
At the close of CSB's case in chief, Smithfield moved for
directed verdict pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 50 (a)
(Transcript of Trial at 87) which the Court granted, resulting in a
judgment of dismissal, no cause of action (Transcript of Trial at
110-112; Record on Appeal at 166-167).
In directing a verdict, the Court must examine the evidence
in a light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict is
intended; and it is not the trial court's province to weigh or
determine the preponderance of the evidence. Finlayson v. Bradv, 121
U. 204, 240 P. 2d 491 (Utah 1952).
The Supreme Court's standard of review of a directed verdict
is the same as that imposed by the trial court; the evidence must be
examined in the light most favorable to the losing party, and if
there is a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the inferences to
be drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in favor of the
-18-

losing party, the directed verdict cannot be sustained.

Management

Committee of Graystone Pines Homeowner's Assn. v. Gravstone Pines,
Inc., 652 P. 2d 896 (Utah 1982).
The evidence admitted in the record in CSB's case in chief
prior to Smithfield's Motion For Directed Verdict supported CSB's
claim of conversion particularly when viewed in the light most
favorable to CSB and in absence of determinations of the weight or
preponderance of that evidence.
CSB simply made a prima facie case of conversion in its case
in chief.

The great weight of authority follows the rule that a

sale of livestock by an auctioneer for a principal who has no title
to the property or holds it subject to a mortgage or lien entails
liability in conversion on the part of the auctioneer who sells it
under such circumstancesf pays over the proceeds to the principal,
and hands the property over to the purchaser with a view to passing
title to him, notwithstanding the auctioneer's lack of knowledge
that the principal lacked authority to sell.

Hills Bank & Trust Co.

v. Arnold Cattle Co,, 316 N.E. 2d 669 (111. 1974).
CSB established these elements in its case in chief:
a).

CSB established that it held a perfected security

interest in "all livestock now owned or hereafter acquired" by
William C. Ericksonf its borrower, predating the sale thereof
conducted by Smithfield (Findings of Fact 5 and 6; Record on Appeal
at 157-158; Trial Exhibits P-l through P-3);
b).

Between the dates of June 15 f 1982 and October 14 f 1982f

William C. Erickson consigned certain livestock for sale to the
Smithfield. Said sales were conducted on twelve (12) separate
-19-

occasions and following each sale, Smithfield issued to Erickson its
check representing the gross amount of the sale realized from the
auction sale of the livestock less a commission of $7.00 per head
sold.

All of the twelve (12) checks bore William C. Erickson as the

sole payee thereon.

No funds were paid over to CSB at any time

(Finding of Fact 9; Record on Appeal at 158; Trial Exhibit P-5);
c).

In the livestock industryf the fair market value of

livestock is what the livestock will bring at sale at any particular
time in a regular market therefore and the Smithfield Livestock
Auction is a regular market for livestock such that its sale of the
Erickson livestock would reflect the fair market value of the same
at the time and place of sale (Finding of Fact 19; Record on Appeal
at 162-163).

Therefore, CSB established the fair market value of

the property at the time and place of conversion.
As argued under Point I above, the trial court granted the
defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict on the basis that the
endorsement on the back of the Smithfield checks to William C.
Erickson (the sole payee), all of which were deposited for
collection to CSB, put CSB on constructive notice of the livestock
sale, and as CSB failed to set off against the account or otherwise
act, it acquiesced in the sale and waived it conversion claim.
"Whether or not there is a waiver or release of a cause of
action is a matter which hinges on the intention of the parties
involved."
672.

Hills Bank & Trust Co. v. Arnold Cattle Co., SttprSr at

For purposes of a directed verdict motion or otherwise, the

only evidence that the trial court had before it at the time it
granted the motion is that the Bank did not intend to waive any
-20-

claims by accepting the checks for deposit and collection (this
position is also legally as well as factually untenable under the
Utah Uniform Commercial Code as argued under Point III below).
Therefore, the trial court viewed the evidence in a light most
unfavorable to CSB in granting the defense motion,

Clearly, at that

stage of the proceedingsf reasonable minds could differ on the facts
giving rise to the waiver issue such that the motion should have
been denied and Smithfield should have been required to present its
case in defense with an opportunity for rebuttal being afforded to
CSB.
The Court improperly weighed the evidence in ruling on the
Motionf and sought to determine the preponderance thereof at that
stage of the trial.

The Court's opening remarks upon ruling on the

Motion indicated the weighing process: " . . . in connection with the
Motion, I see some validity to that and in several areasf some of
which have less validity than others."
105).

(Transcript of Trial at

The Court thereafter proceeded to weigh and analyze the

evidence at some lengthf ultimately ruling on the endorsement/waiver
theory.
Had the trial court construed the evidence in the light most
favorable to CSB and afforded CSB the benefit of all reasonable
inference to be drawn therefrom,

Smithfield1s Motion for Directed

Verdict should have been denied.

However, the trial court viewed

the evidence in the light most unfavorable to CSB.

Therefore, the

order granting the Motion for Directed Verdict should be reversed
and the case remanded to the District Court for a full trial on the
merits.
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POINT III
A LIVESTOCK AUCTIONEER IS LIABLE TO A SECURED PARTY FOR
CONVERSION OF THE SECURED PROPERTY WHEN THE AUCTIONEER SELLS
THE SECURED PROPERTY WITHOUT REMITTING THE PROCEEDS TO THE
SECURED PARTY UNLESS ACQUIESCENCE OR WAIVER OF THE SECURED
PARTY IS SHOWN.
Unfortunatelyf the trial Court failed to make a clear
conclusion or finding as to whether Smithfield would have been
liable in conversion to CSB but for the waiver and estoppel the
court found based upon the endorsement on the Smithfield checks.
Howeverf the Court made sufficient findings and conclusions in the
record which indicate that Smithfield was clearly liable in
conversion to CSB.

The issue of whether that liability was estopped

or waived is treated at Point IV herein.
Initiallyf the Court entered the Conclusion of Law that
"plaintiff's predecessor in interest. Bear River State Bankf held
and possessed a valid security interest in and to all livestock of
William C. Erickson and Susan S. Erickson owned or acquired after
the date of their security agreement, June 8 f 1982f the same which
was duly perfected by a U.C.C. 1 Financing Statement filing with the
office of the Secretary of State, State of Utah, on June 23, 1982."
(Conclusion of Law No. 1, Record on Appeal at 162).
Additionally, the Court made the Finding of Fact that
"between the dates of June 15, 1982 and October 14, 1982, inclusive,
Ericksons consigned certain livestock for sale to defendant
Smithfield Livestock Auction.

Said sales were conducted on twelve

(12) separate occasions and following each sale, the defendant
issued to Erickson its check representing the gross amount of the
-22-

proceeds realized from the auction of the livestock on that
particular occasion less a commission of $7.00 per head sold.

All

of said twelve (12) checks were issued by the defendant to Erickson
with William C. Erickson as the sole payee thereon and all were
deposited for collection to the Erickson checking account at Bear
River State Bank by Erickson . . . "

(Finding of Fact No. 10; Record

on Appeal at 159-160).
Several cases consisting of identical facts to those of the
instant case have consistently held that where a livestock auction
sells consigned livestock in which the plaintiff holds a perfected
security interestf the livestock auction is liable to the secured
party for conversion of the secured property unless facts creating
waiver or release or consent by the secured party are shown.

in mils

Pc*nk end Trust Company vs. Arnold Cflttlg cpmpanyr

316 N.E. 2d 669 (111. 1974) f the court held, citing to 96 ALR 2d
210f

as follows:
The great weight of authority follows the rule that sale of
an auctioneer for a principal who has no title to the
property or who holds it subject to a mortgage or other lien
or who for other reasons has no right to dispose of it
entails liability to the conversion on that part of the
auctioneer who sells it under such circumstancesf pays over
the proceeds to the principalr and hands the property over to
the purchaser with a view to passing the title to him not
withstanding the auctioneer's lack of knowledge of the
principal's lack of authority to sell. 316 N.E. 2d at 371.
It is interesting to note in the Hills Bank and Trust case

that the court allowed the action for conversion to lie against the
auctioneer and in favor of the plaintiff bank even though the
plaintiff had released its chattel mortgages. 316 N.E. 2d at 371•
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In the case of Farmers State Bank vs. w. M. Stewart, et. al..
454 S.W. 2d 908 (Mo. 1970), the court upheld an action for
conversion against a livestock auction where the borrowers consigned
the livestock to the auction for sale when the bank had a superior
security interest in the livestock.

The court in Farmers State Bank

further found that the livestock auction was liable for the value of
the livestock in conversion even though it was not on actual, but
rather constructive notice of the plaintiff's security interest in
the livestock.

The Farmers State Bank case left no doubt that the

recording of a financing statement or chattel mortgage constitutes
notice of the contents thereof to all the world such that the
livestock auction has constructive notice that the stock owner and
borrower has no right to sell the livestock when presented for that
purpose. 454 S.W. 2d at 915.
Several other cases involving livestock auctions under
identical circumstances such as those found in the instant case have
uniformly held that the livestock auction is liable to the secured
party in conversion and must turn the funds over to the secured
party or pay the market value of the collateral at the time and
place of conversion.

.fige., e.g.. United States vs. Gallatin

Livestock Auction. 448 F. Supp. 616 (W.D. Mo. 1978); nnited States
of America vs. Topeka Livestock Auction. Inc.. 392 F. Supp. 944
(N.D. Ind. 1975); United States of America vs. Squires. 370 F. Supp.
798 (S.D. Iowa 1974); and State Securities Company vs. Norfolk
Livestock Sales Company. Inc.. 187 Neb. 446, 191 N.W. 2d 614 (Neb.
1971) .
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As in all cases where the tort of conversion is allegedf the
measure of damages in a conversion action of this type is the fair
market value of the property at the time the conversion took place
rather than the amount retained by the converter. United States vs.

TQpeka Livestock Auctionr inctr XJL. at 948.
Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the Court failed to
made a clear and concise finding that Smithfield would have been
liable in conversion to the plaintiff but for the waiver and
estoppel found by the Court, it is clear that the Court made
sufficient Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law presenting all of
the elements necessary to sustain a cause of action for conversion
in this case.
The next issue is one of whether CSB was subject to the
endorsement instructions on the checks, or on notice thereof in any
form, thereby creating the waiver and estoppel defenses against the
conversion claim which the Court held were total defenses thereto.
That issue will be treated on the next point below.

POINT IV
A COLLECTING BANK IS NEITHER GIVEN NOTICE NOR OTHERWISE
AFFECTED BY A RESTRICTIVE ENDORSEMENT OF ANY PERSON EXCEPT
THE BANK'S IMMEDIATE TRANSFEROR.
One of the great favors which the Uniform Commercial Code did
for financial institutions was to exempt them from any
responsibility for restrictive endorsements or endorsement
instructions given by any party in the check deposit and collection
process except for the bank's customerf referred to in the Code as
"the bank's immediate transferor".
-25-

The drafters of the Uniform

Commercial Code provided this exemption to banks as they realized
the practicalities and logistics involved in the check deposit and
collection process.

"Banks ordinarily handle instrumentsf

especially checksf in bulkf and have no practicable opportunity to
consider the effect of restrictive endorsements."
3 to Section 3-206 of the Uniform Commercial Code.

Official Comment
These exemptions

in favor banks from such endorsements are "for the purpose of
permitting items to move rapidly through banking channels

..."

Official Comment Number 2 to Section 4-205 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.

See 33,59 6 Banking Law. Section 115.15 (2) f Matthew Bender

and Companyf 1986.
Initiallyf in this circumstancef CSB (which was at the time
Bear River State Bank) is what is known as the "collecting bank".
UTAH CODE ANN. Section 70A-4-105 (d) states that a collecting bank
"means any bank handling the item for collection except the payor
bank."

Subsection (b) of that statute defines "payor bank" to mean

"a bank by which an item is payable as drawn or accepted (the drawee
bank or the bank upon which the check is drawn)."

In the instant

casef Judge Christoffersen ruled that in this circumstance that CSB
was the "collecting bank".

(Transcript of Trial, Page 108 f Line 20;

Conclusion of Law No. 5; Record on Appeal at 163-164) .

The question

becomes one of what effect restrictive endorsements and/or
endorsement instructions have on a "collecting bank" when applied to
the instrument by a party other than the Bank's immediate
transferor.
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First, CSB contends that the language on the reverse side of
the Smithfield Livestock Auction checks is not a "restrictive
endorsement" as defined by the Codef but rather is what is known as
"endorsement instructions".

The term "restrictive endorsement" is

defined by the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. 70A-3-205 as one that is
"(a) conditional; or, (b) purports to prohibit further transfer of
the instrument; or (c) includes the words 'for collection1, 'for
deposit', 'pay any bank', or like term signifying a purpose of
deposit or collection; or (d) otherwise states that it is for the
benefit or use of the endorser or of another person."
The purpose of Section 70A-3-205 of the Code is to provide a
definition of restrictive endorsements which will include the
varieties of endorsements described in the original Sections 36 and
39 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act.
Uniform Commercial Code Section 3-205.

Official Comment 1 to

The endorsement provided on

the reverse side of Smithfield checks is not conditional nor does it
prohibit further transfer of the instrument nor does it include
words like "for collection", "for deposit only", "pay any bank" or
like terms signifying a purpose of deposit or collection.

The

endorsement is merely a warranty given by the consignor of cattle to
Smithfield (and hence the payee on the checks) that the cattle
submitted were sold free of mortgages.

Unquestionably, William C.

Erickson as payee breached that warranty to Smithfield; however, a
warranty, as is the case with lien waiver language, is not a
restrictive endorsement.
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It is especially interesting to note, given the defenses
raised by Smithfield that a livestock auction would be subject to
the lien of the bank as would the subsequent purchaser of the cattle
in this particular case in any event.

UTAH CODE ANN. 70A-9-307

states that Ma buyer in the ordinary course of business other than a
person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming
operations takes free of a security interest created by his seller
even though the security interest is perfected and even though the
buyer knows of its existence (emphasis added)." The drafters of the
Code made a specific and clear exception to the ordinary course of
business rule where one buys farm products from a person engaged in
farming operations.

Thereforef in this case, in spite of the

endorsement instructionsf the lien in favor of CSB follows the
livestock through the hands of all purchasers and consignees.

The

Code affords a high degree of protection to lienholders of farm
products by specifically excepting buyers of farm products obtaining
farm products from one engaged in farming operations from the
bonafide purchaser protections afforded to other purchasers of other
types of goods under the Code.
UTAH CODE ANN. Section 70A-4-203 clearly exempts CSB from any
notice or responsibility arising by virtue of the endorsement
instructions on the reverse side of the Smithfield Livestock Auction
checks and its terms further point up the manifest error in the
application of the law made by the trial Court.

That Section states

in full text as follows:
"Subject to the provisions of Article 3 concerning conversion
of instruments (Section 3-419) and the provisions of both
Article 3 and this article concerning restrictive
endorsements, only a collecting bank's transferor can give
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instructions which affect the bank or constitute notice to it
and a collecting bank is not liable to prior parties for any
action taken pursuant to such instructions or in accordance
with any agreement with its transferor." (emphasis added).
The warranty endorsement instructions on the Smithfield
checks constitutes an agreement between Smithfield and CSB's
transferror/ William C. Erickson; that type of agreement has no
effect on the collecting bank pursuant to the provisions of Section
4-203.
It is interesting in the Trial Transcript that the trial
Courtf when confronted with the application of Section 70A-4-203 to
its ruling in the casef could only attempt to carve out an exception
to the provisions of the Section which finds no authority in the
language of the statute.

Commencing at Page 109f Line 18 of the

Trial Transcript/ the dialogue between plaintiff's counsel and the
Court proceeded as follows:
MR. SHIELDS: Your Honorf if I may inquire briefly, what
is the Court's interpretation of the Section 4-203? That is
the question I have.
THE COURT:

Section which one?

MR. DAINES: I'll give it to the Court if the Court wants
to see it. It's right here Your Honor, 4-203.
THE COURT: Well, I don't think this has any effect on what
I'm saying as to the restrictive endorsement as to it just
being a collecting bank. . . . if they were a collecting bank
who didn't have a mortgage on these cattle, I don't think
that it would — I think then 70A-4-203 would apply . . . "
This exception analysis was further defined commencing at
Page lllr Line 22 of the Trial Transcript when the dialogue
proceeded as follows:
MR. SHIELDS: So the court is carving out an exception to
4-203 if there is a collecting bank —
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THE COURT:

A particular set of circumstances.

In shortf the Court held that there would be no waiver and
presumably liability in conversion of Smithfield to CSB if CSB had
been just a collecting bank of the checks in question; however, the
Court is making an exception that when there is a collecting bank
which is also a mortgagee of collateral that the protections of
Section 4-203 do not apply.

This exception finds no basis in the

language of the statute as no common sense construction can be made
to bootstrap that exception into it.

Furtherr the exception is

entirely illogical in view of the reasons for Section 4-203 being
included in the Code.

As cited above, the protections afforded to

collecting banks against endorsement instructions and restrictive
endorsements were extended to banks in order to speed the deposit
and collection process and recognizing the logistical problem that
banks have so many checks to deal with on a daily basis that they
have no practicable opportunity to examine restrictive endorsements
and endorsement instructions.

The fact that a bank is also a

mortgagee of collateral would in no way serve to reduce the number
of checks that are being processed or to make it more practicable
for a bank to examine the endorsements which may be on checks that
it takes in for collection.
In Swiss Baco Skyline Logging. Inc. vs. Haliewicz. et. a l w
567 P. 2d 1141 (Wash. 1977) , the Court of Appeals of Washington
applied the provisions of Section 4-203 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (the Washington and Utah versions of 4-203 are identical)

to

affirm a summary judgment in favor of defendant Bank of California
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against a claim of plaintiff that the Bank negotiated a check over a
notice of claim against the check.
In April and August of 1973f plaintiff Swiss Bacof through
its then President, Emil Haliewicz, purchased two U.S. Forest
Service contractsf known as the Calasit and Sitkum contracts.

On

October 31, 1973/ Haliewicz resigned as President/ continued
thereafter to negotiate for sale of both contracts/ and was
expressly authorized by the corporation to negotiate for the sale of
the Calasit contract only.

Howeverf Swiss Baco claimed it was not

aware of Haliewicz's efforts on the Sitkum contract until shortly
prior to filing the lawsuit.

567 P. 2d at 1144.

In the course of negotiations/ Haliewicz came in contact with
one William Bellmf principal of General Log and Timber/ whof in
December 1973/ took primary responsibility as broker in the proposed
sale of the two timber contracts to West Coast Orient Timber Co.
The negotiations culminated in an agreement in which West Coast
Orient agreed to pay a cash advance of $250/000.00 on the Calasit
contract and $85/000.00 on the Sitkum contract.

West Coast Orient

then proceeded to transfer the cash advance in accordance with
instructions from Bellm and Haliewicz.

It was agreed that West

Coast Orient would wire the funds to Bellm1s bank/ Bank of
California.

When the wired funds arrived/ Bellm and Haliewicz went

to Bank of California and instructed a bank officer to disburse a
portion of the funds in certain cashier's checks; one check/ for
$80/000.00 was made payable to Haliewicz personally.

Swiss Baco

sued Bank of California contending that it breached a duty to Swiss
Baco to exercise due care in the deposit and disbursement of the
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funds and by breaching that dutyf is subject to liability for
negligence. Id.
The duty claim arose based on wire transfer instructions from
Bank of California's San Francisco branch (where West Coast Orient's
bank originally wired the funds) to its Seattle branch (where Bellm
had his account), which stated as follows:
M

. . . WE CREDIT YOU 348,000
ATTN ROBERT JASPER FOR
ACCT GENERAL LOG AND
TIMBER CO AND SWISS BACO
SKYLINE LOGGING . . . BY
ORDER WEST COAST ORIENT . . . "
In concluding that Bank of California had no obligation or
duty to Swiss Bacof the Court held:
A bank does owe a duty to its "customers" to use due care
in the issuance and payment of checks on customers' accounts.
Swiss Baco, however, was not a "customer" of the Bank of
California, because it did not have an account with the
defendant bank nor did the Bank of California agree "to
collect items" for Swiss Baco.
62-A 4-104 (1)(e) defines Customer" as any person having
an account with a bank or for whom a bank has agreed to

collect items . . .
Because Swiss Baco was neither customer, payee, nor
endorser, the defendant Bank of California owed it no duty.
Under RCW 62A 4-203, the Bank of California was entitled
to rely on the instructions given to it by its immediate
advising bank. We have before us only the interbranch credit
wire which directed the credit to a specific account. Normal
banking procedures dictate that, in carrying out those
instructions, the specific number of the account contained on
the credit instructions determines the account to which the
funds must be credited. The added fact that Haliewicz
participated in directing the disposition of those proceeds
is immaterial as far as the Bank of California is concerned
so long as it followed its customer's orders. The trial
Court properly granted summary judgment for the defendant
Bank of California. 567 P. 2d at 1146.
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The Court's decision in the instant case has imposed upon CSB
the duty to monitor and enforce the warranty of William C. Erickson
to Smithfield that the cattle were not subject to a lien or that
Erickson would have the lien released; this notwithstanding that the
Smithfield Livestock Auction was not at any time relevant hereto a
customer of CSB.

The instructions of CSB's customer, William C.

Erickson, to CSB came in the form of Erickson1s deposit slips
instructing CSB to collect the checks to Erickson1s account; this
CSB did, thereby discharging the full tenor of its duty to all
parties concerned.
The Court's decision is clearly in contravention of
unambiguous statutory provisions directly on point to the subject
matter of the case and, in any event, defies any reasonable logic or
interpretation that could be applied to the facts of this case or to
the provisions of the statute.

The trial Court took incredible

liberties with the law and the facts of this case to render a
decision in favor of the defendant.

CONCLUSION
It is clear from the arguments above that the trial court's
judgment of dismissal, no cause of action, was both procedurally and
substantively defective.

As a procedural matter, the trial court

granted Smithfield's Motion for Directed Verdict improperly as it
failed to view the evidence presented in CSB's case-in-chief in the
light most favorable to CSB and undertook to weigh and determine the
preponderance of the evidence at that stage of the trial; this
notwithstanding that CSB established a prima facie case of
conversion.

As a substantive matter, the trial court erroneously
-33-

ruled that CSB was subject to endorsement instructions upon
instruments to which CSB was not a party.

The authority argued to

the Court which fully supports CSB's position.

CSB respectfully

requests that this Court reverse the judgment of the trial court,
determine that CSB did not waive its claim for conversion against
Smithfield by virtue of being subject to the endorsement on the back
of the Smithfield checks, determine that Smithfield is liable in
conversion to CSBf and remanding the case to the District Court for
entry of judgment consistent with such opinion of this Court.
DATED this

__ day of Februaryf 1987.

Respectfully submittedf
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK

-V4^£^
^l§f£j>eypfy^t o n S h i e l ds
A s s i s t a n t General Counsel
Attorney for Appellant
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70A-4-208*

(a) he has a good title to the item or is authorprotest; a n d
(e) notifying its transferor of any loss or delay ized to obtain payment or acceptance on behalf of
in transit within a reasonable time after discovery one who has a good title; and
thereof.
(b) he has n o knowledge that the signature of
(2) A collecting bank taking proper action before the maker or drawer is unauthorized, except that
its midnight deadline following receipt of an item,
this warranty is not given by any customer or collnotice or payment acts seasonably; taking proper ecting bank that is a holder in due course and acts
action within a reasonably longer time may be sea* in good faith.
sonable but the bank has the burden of so establis(i) to a maker with respect to the maker's
hing.
own signature; or
(3) Subject to subsection (1)00. a bank is not
(ii) to a drawer with respect to the drawer's
liable for the insolvency, neglect, misconduct,
own signature, whether or not the drawer is also the
mistake or default o f another bank or person or for drawee; or
loss or destruction o f an item in transit or in the
(iii) to an acceptor of an item if the holder in
possession nf others* _ ^ — ^ ^ I N S due course took the item after the acceptance or
obtained the acceptance without knowledge that the
70A-4-203. Effect of instructions.
/ Subject to the provisions o f chapter 3 concerning L drawer's signature was unauthorized; and
(c) the item has not been materially altered,
(conversion o f instruments (section 70A-3-419) | \
land the. provisions of both chapter 3 and this W e p t that this warranty is not given by any cust/chapter concerning restrictive indorsements only a omer or collecting bank that is a holder in due
collecting bank's transferor can give instructions cpurse and acts in good faith
|
(i) to the maker of a note; or
which affect the bank or constitute notice to it and
(ii) to the drawer o f a draft whether or not
a collecting bank is not liable to prior parties for
any action taken pursuant to such instructions or in the drawer is also the drawee; or
(iii) to the acceptor o f an item with respect to
accordance with any agreement with its transferor.
alteration
made prior to the acceptance if the
\ t O A ^ W T M e t h o d s of senoHig and Uicsentfng
holder in due course took the item after the accepSending direct to payor bank.
(1) A collecting bank must send items by reason- tance, even though the acceptance provided
"payable as originally drawn" or equivalent terms;
ably prompt method taking into consideration any
relevant instructions, the nature of the item, the or
(iv) to the acceptor o f an item with respect to
number o f such items on hand, and the cost of
collection involved and the method generally used an alteration made after the acceptance.
(2) Each customer and collecting bank who tranby it or others to present such items.
sfers an item and receives a settlement or other
(2) A collecting bank may send
consideration for it warrants to his transferee and to
(a) any item direct to the payor bank;
(b) any item t o any nonbank payor if author- any subsequent collecting bank w h o takes the item
in good faith that
ized by its transferor; and
(a) he has a good title to the item or is author(c) a n y item other than documentary drafts to
a n y nonbank payor, if authorized by Federal ized to obtain payment or acceptance on behalf of
Reserve regulation or operating letter, clearinghouse one who has a good title and the transfer is otherwise rightful; and
rule or the like.
(b) all signatures are genuine or authorized; and
(3) Presentment may be made by a presenting
(c) the item has not been materially altered; and
bank at a place where the payor bank has requested
(d) n o defense o f any party is good against him;
that presentment be made.
INS
and
70A-4-205. Supplying missing indorsement • No
(e) he has n o knowledge o f any insolvency
notice from prior indorsement.
proceeding instituted with respect to the maker or
(1) A depositary bank which has taken an item acceptor or the drawer o f an unaccepted item. In
for collection may supply any indorsement of the addition each customer and collecting bank so tracustomer which is necessary to title unless the item nsferring an item and receiving a settlement or other
contains the words "payee's indorsement required" consideration engages that upon dishonor and any
or the like. In the absence of such a requirement a
necessary notice of dishonor and protest he will take
statement placed on the item by the depositary bank
up the item.
to the effect that the item was deposited by a cust(3) The warranties and the engagement to honor
omer or credited to his account is effective as the set forth in the two preceding subsections arise
customer's indorsement.
notwithstanding the absence o f indorsement or
(2) A n intermediary bank, o r payor bank which is words of guaranty or warranty in the transfer or
not a depositary bank, is neither given notice nor presentment and a collecting bank remains liable for
otherwise affected by a restrictive indorsement o f their breach despite remittance to its transferor.
any person except the bank's immediate transferor.
Damages for breach of such warranties or engage1965
70A-4-206. Transfer between banks.
ment to honor shall not exceed the consideration
Any agreed method which identifies the transferor
received by the customer or collecting bank respobank is sufficient for the item's further transfer to nsible plus finance charges and expenses related to
another bank.
1963 the item, if any.
70A-4-207. Warranties of customer and collecting
(4) Unless a claim for breach of warranty under
bank on transfer or presentment of items - Time
this section is made within a reasonable time after
for claims.
the person claiming learns of the breach, the person
(1) Each customer or collecting bank who obtains liable is discharged to the extent of any loss caused
payment or acceptance of an item and each prior
by the delay in making claim.
i9*s
customer and collecting bank warrants to the payor 70A-4-208. Security interest of collecting bank in
bank or other payor who in good faith pays or
Items, accompanying documents and proceeds.
accepts the item that
(1) A bank has a security interest in an i:em and
Code • Co
Provo. Luh
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tion applicable throughout this chapter.
i%5
70A-4-105. "Depositary bank" - "Intermediary
bank" - "Collecting bank" - "Payor bank" "Presenting bank" - "Remitting bank."
In this chapter unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) "Depositary bank" means the first bank to
which an item is transferred for collection even
though ii is also the payor bank;
(b) "Payor bank" means a bank by which an item
is payable as drawn or accepted;
(c) "Intermediary bank" means any bank to which
an item is transferred in course of collection except
the depositary or payor bank;
(d) "Collecting bank" means any bank handling
the item for collection except the payor bank;
(e) "Presenting bank" means any bank presenting
an item except a payor bank;
(0 "Remitting bank" means any payor or intermediary bank remitting for an item.
i%5
70A-4-106. Separate office of a bank.
A branch or separate office of a bank is a separate bank for the purpose of computing the time
within which and determining the place at or to
which action may be taken or notices or orders shall
be given under this chapter and under chapter 3. 1965
70A-4-107. Time of receipt of items.
(1) For the purpose of allowing time to process
items, prove balances and make the necessary entries
on the books to determine its position for the day, a
bank may fix an afternoon hour of two p.m. or
later as a cutoff hour for the handling of money
and items and the making of entries on its books.
<2) Any Item or deposit of money received on any
day after a cutoff hour so fixed or after the close of
the banking day may be treated as being received at
the opening of the next banking day.
i**s
70A-4-108. Delays.
(1) Unless otherwise instructed, a collecting bank
in a good faith effort to secure payment may, in the
case of specific items and with or without the approval of any person involved, waive, modify or
extend time limits imposed or permitted by this act
for a period not in excess of an additional banking
day without discharge of secondary parties and
without liability to its transferor or any prior party.
(2) Delay by a collecting bank or payor bank
beyond time limits prescribed or permitted by this
act or by instructions is excused if caused by interruption of communication facilites, suspension of
payments by another bank, war, emergency conditions or other circumstances beyond the control of
the bank provided it exercises such diligence as the
circumstances require.
i%5
70A-4-109. Process of posting.
The "process of posting" means the usual procedure followed by a payor bank in determining to
pay an item and in recording the payment including
one or more of the following or other steps as determined by the bank:
(a) verification of any signature;
(b) ascertaining that sufficient funds are available;
(c) affixing a 'paid* or other stamp;
(d) entering a charge or entry to a customer's
account;
(e) correcting or reversing an entry or erroneous
action with respect to the item.
tws

Part 2. Collection of Items - Depositary and
Collecting Banks
?iA-4-201.1
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of collecting banks and provisional status of credits Applicability of chapter - Item indorsed "pay any
bank."
70A-4-202. Responsiblity for collection • When action
seasonable.
70A-4-203. Effect of instructions.
70A-4-204. Methods of sending and presenting •
Sending direct to payor bank.
70A-4-205. Supplying missing indorsement - No notice
from prior indorsement.
70A-4-206. Transfer between banks.
70A-4-207. Warranties of customer and collecting bank
on transfer or presentment of items - Time for claims.
70A-4-208. Security interest of collecting bank in items,
accompanying documents and proceeds.
,70A-4-209. When bank gives value for purposes of
• holder in due course.
70A-4-210. Presentment by notice of item not payable
by, through or at a bank - Liability of secondary
parties.
70A-4-211. Media of remittance - Provisional and final
settlement in remittance cases.
70A-4-212. Right of charge-back or refund.
70A-4-213. Final payment of item by payor bank When provisional debits and credits become final When certain credits become available for withdrawal.
70A-4-214. Insolvency and prefereoce.
70A-4-201. Presumption and duration of agency
status of collecting banks and provisional status
of credits - Applicability of chapter - Item
indorsed "pay any bank."
.
(1) Unless a contrary intent clearly appears and
prior to the time that a settlement given by a collecting bank for an. item is or becomes fin "
(subsection (3) of section 70A-4-211 and sections
70A-4-212 and 70A-4-213) the bank is an
agent or subagent of the owner of the item and any
settlement given for the item is provisional. This
provision applies regardless of the form of indorsement or lack of indorsement and even though credit
given for the item is subject to immediate withdrawal as of right or is in fact withdrawn; but the
continuance of ownership of an item by its owner^
and any rights of the owner to proceeds of the item
are subject to rights of a collecting bank such afcv
those resulting from outstanding advances on the .
item and valid rights of setoff. When an item b
handled by banks for purposes of presentment,
payment and collection, the relevant provisions of
this chapter apply even though action of parties
clearly establishes that a particular bank has purchased the item and is the owner of it.
(2) After an item has been indorsed with the
words "pay any bank" or the like, only a bank may
acquire the rights of a holder
'_
(a) until the item has been returned to the cus-' *
'rtfcjS^
tomer initiating collection; or
(b) until the item has been specially indorsed by'
a bank to a person who is not a bank.
mi
70A-4-202. Responsiblity for collection - When
action seasonable.
."_.*''
(1) A collecting bank must use ordinary care in
4(a) presenting an item or sending it for preset^
tment;and
, \%
(b) sending notice of dishonor or nonpayment,
or returning an item other than a documentary draty*
to the bank's transferor or directly.to the depositary t
bank under subsection (2) of section 70A-4-21Z,
after learning that the item has not been
accepted, as the case may be; and 1: ^ ^ 1 ^ . ^
(c) settling for an item when the bank,
final settlement; and
-'"'**•-• * * A
(d) making or providing for+-j£*i
I the UTAH ADVANCE BEPORTS

-^sr&si
-k± i

*r<xP*&.
5£* v*.- i . _

JF^.

•

-spf2^
70A-3-119.

Uniform Commercial Code

taking from a later holder in due course.
(2) A transfer of a security interest in an instrument vests the foregoing rights in the transferee to
the extent of the interest transferred.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed a n y transfer for value
of an instrument not then payable to bearer gives
the transferee the specifically enforceable right to
have the unqualified indorsement of the transferor.
Negotiation takes effect only when the endorsement
is made and until that time there is no presumption
that the transferee is the owner.
i%s
70A-3-202. Negotiation.
(1) Negotiation is the transfer of an instrument in
such form that the transferee becomes a holder. If
the instrument is payable t o order it is negotiated by
delivery with any necessary indorsement; if payable
to bearer it is negotiated by delivery.
(2) A n indorsement must be written by or on
behalf of the holder and on the instrument or on a
paper so firmly affixed thereto as t o become a part
thereof.
(3) A n indorsement is effective for negotiation
only when it conveys the entire instrument or any
unpaid residue. If it purports t o be o f less it operates only as a partial assignment.
(4) Words o f assignment, condition, waiver,
IMS
guaranty, limitation or disclaimer o f liability a n d the
70A-3-121. Instruments payable at bank.
like accompanying an indorsement d o not affect its
A note or acceptance which states that it is
Ms
payable at a bank is not o f itself an order or auth- character as an indorsement.
orization t o the bank t o p a y it.
IMS 70A-3-203. Wrong or misspelled name.
Where an instrument is made payable t o a person
70A-3-122. Accrual o f cause of action.
under a misspelled name or one other than his own
(1) A cause o f action against a maker or an acche may indorse in that name or his o w n or both;
eptor accrues
(a) in the case o f a time instrument o n the day but signature in both names may be required b y a
person paying or giving value for the instrument.. 1*5
after maturity;
70A-3-204. Special indorsement - Blank •>•*.
(b) in the case o f a demand instrument upon its
indorsement.
•"' *> '* ±i+ <-•> Crx
date or, if no date is stated, o n the date o f issue.
(1) A special indorsement specifies the-person t o
• •: (2) A cause o f action against the obligor o f a
demand or time certificate o f deposit accrues upon whom or to whose order it makes the instrument
demand, but demand o n a time certificate may not payable. A n y instrument specially indorsed becomes
payable t o the order o f the special indorsee and may
be made until on or after the date o f maturity.
(3) A cause o f action against a drawer of a draft be further negotiated only by his indorsement*
(2) A n indorsement in blank specifies n o particor an indorser o f any instrument accrues upon
demand following dishonor o f the instrument. ular indorsee and may consist o f a mere signature.
An instrument payable to order and indorsed in
Notice of dishonor is a demand.
(4) Unless an instrument provides otherwise, int- blank becomes payable to bearer and may- be negoerest runs at the rate provided by law for a judg- tiated by delivery alone until specially indorsed.'
(3) The holder may convert a blarik indorsement
ment
(a) in the case o f a maker, acceptor or other into a special indorsement by writing over the signprimary obligor o f a demand instrument, from the ature o f the indorser in blank any contractfc consistent with the character o f the indorsement.
* itss
date o f demand;
.. *
(b) in all other cases from the date of accrual of 70A-3-205. Restrictive indorsements.
A n indorsement is restrictive which-either •'the cause of action.
IMS
(a) is conditional; or
- •"
Part 2 . Transfer and Negotiation
(b) purports to prohibit further transfer o f the
instrument; or
'.-,».,..',
70A-3-201. Transfer - Right to indorsement.
(c) includes the words "for collection.'', •for
70A-J-202. Negotiation.
deposit," "pay a n y b a n k / or like terms signifying a
70A-J-203. Wrong or misspelled name.
purpose o f deposit or collection; or
70A-3-204. Special indorsement - Blank indorsement.
(d) otherwise states that it is for the benefit pr.use
70A-3-205. Restrictive indorsements.
of the indorser or o f another person.
'2- \ JI« ats . 70A-3-2O6. Effect of restrictive indorsement.
70A-3-2O7. Negotiation effective although it may be
70A-3-206. Effect o f restrictive iudommafel
^ « £ , • }?
(1) N o restrictive indorsement prevent^ further *j&
.TtvUMftf.
transfer or negotiation o f the i n s t r u m e n t . ^ zi^^t
'^'
** *!• --I ." .
. .
(2) A n intermediary bank, or a payor.bank whkfc r1
T 0 A 4 - 2 9 1 . Transfer - Right t o indorsement.
is not t h e depositary bank, is neither given notice
(1) Transfer o f a n instrument vests in the transf- nor otherwise affected by a restrictive indorsement
eree such rights a s the transferor has therein, except o f any person except the bank's inmiediate transfthat a transferee w h o has himself been a party t o eror or the person presenting for payment. ? ' \
#
any fraud or illegality affecting the instrument or
(3) Except for an intermediary bank, any transfw h o a s a prior holder h a d notice o f a defense or eree under an indorsement which is conditional o r
d a i m against it cannot improve his position by
pay.
( 0 UnJess otherwise specified consent to extension
authorizes a single extension for not longer than the
original period. A consent t o extension, expressed in
the instrument, is binding on secondary parties and
a c c o m m o d a t i o n makers. A holder m a y not exercise
his option t o extend a n instrument over the objection of a maker o r acceptor or other party who in
accordance with section 70A-3-604 tenders full
payment when the instrument is due.
1965
70A-3-119. Other writings affecting instrument.
(1) A s between the obligor a n d his immediate
obligee o r a n y transferee the terms of an instrument
may be modified o r affected by a n y other written
agreement executed a s a part o f the same transaction, except that a holder in d u e course is n o t affected by a n y limitation o f his rights arising out of the
separate written agreement if he had n o notice of
the limitation when he took the instrument.
(2) A separate agreement does not affect the
negotiability of an instrument.
1965
70A-3-120. Instruments "payable through" bank.
A n instrument which states that it is "payable
through" a bank or the like designates that bank as
a collecting bank t o make presentment but does not
o f itself authorize the bank to pay the instrument.

652

F«r ANNOTATIONS. <

**• v?"^

*

/ryj^fT:"

70A-9-306.
i* * " « r
Ak'-^^

• !ll?V

Uniform Commercial Code

urity interest m a y be otherwise perfected as provided
in this chapter before o r after t h e period of pos?ession by the secured party.
1977
70A-9-306. "Proceeds* - Secured party's rights
on disposition of collateral.
(1) "Proceeds* includes whatever is received upon
the sale, exchange, collection o r other disposition of
collateral o r proceeds. Insurance payable by reason
of loss o r damage t o the collateral is proceeds,
except t o the extent that it is payable t o a person
other than a party t o the security agreement.
Money, checks, deposit accounts a n d the like are
"cash proceeds." All other proceeds a r e "noncash
proceeds."
(2) Except where this chapter otherwise provides,
a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange o r other disposition thereof
unless t h e disposition was authorized by t h e secured
party in t h e security agreement or otherwise, a n d
also continues in any identifiable proceeds including
collections received by the debtor.
(3) The security interest in proceeds is a cori)
ously perfected security interest if the interest in the
original collateral was perfected but it ceases t o be a
perfected security interest and becomes unperfected
ten days after receipt o f the proceeds by the debtor
unless
(a) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral and the proceeds are collateral in
which a security interest may be perfected by filing
in the office or offices where the financing statement has been filed and, if the proceeds are acquired with cash proceeds, the description o f collateral
in the financing statement indicates the types o f
property constituting the proceeds; or
(b) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral and the proceeds are identifiable cash
proceeds; or
(c) the security interest in the proceeds is perfected before t h e expiration o f the ten-day period.
Except as provided in this section, a security interest
in proceeds can be perfected only by the methods or
under the circumstances permitted in this chapter
for original collateral o f the same type.
(4) In the event o f insolvency proceedings instituted by or against a debtor, a secured party with a
perfected security interest in proceeds has a perfected security interest only in the following proceeds:
(a) in identifiable noncash proceeds and in
separate deposit accounts containing only proceeds;
(b) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form o f
money which is neither commingled with other
money nor deposited in a deposit account prior to
the insolvency proceedings;
(c) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form o f
checks and the like which are not deposited in a
deposit account prior to the insolvency proceedings;
and
(d) in all cash and deposit accounts o f the
debtor i n which proceeds have been commingled
with other funds, but the perfected security interest
under this paragraph (d) is
(i) subject to any right of setoff; and
(ii) limited t o an amount not greater than the
amount o f a n y cash proceeds received by the debtor
within ten days before the institution o f the insolvency proceedings less the turn o f (I) the payments t o
the secured party o n account o f cash proceeds received b y the debtor during such period and (II) the
cash proceeds received b y the debtor during such
period t o which t h e secured party is entitled under
paragraphs (a) through (c) of this subsection (4).
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(5) If a sale of goods results in a n account or
chattel paper which is transferred by t h e seller t o a
secured party, a n d if t h e goods a r e returned t o or
are repossessed by t h e seller o r the secured party,
the following rules determine priorities:
(a) If the goods were collateral at t h e time of
sale for an indebtedness of t h e seller which is still
unpaid, the original security interest attaches again
to t h e goods a n d continues as a perfected security
interest if it was perfected at t h e time when the
goods were sold. If t h e security interest was originally perfected by a filing which is still effective,
nothing further is required to continue the perfected
status; in any other case, the secured party must
take possession of the returned o r repossessed goods
or must file.
(b) A n unpaid transferee of the chattel paper
has a security interest in t h e goods against the transferor. Such security interest is prior to a security
interest asserted under paragraph (a) to the extent
hat the transferee o f the chattel paper was entitled
to priority under section 70A-9-308.
(c) A n unpaid transferee o f the account has a
security interest in the goods against the transferor.
Such security interest is subordinate to a security
interest asserted under paragraph (a).
(d) A security interest of an unpaid transferee
asserted under paragraph (b) or (c) must be perfected for protection against creditors of the transferor and purchasers of the returned or repossessed
goods.
wn
70A-9-307. Protection of buyers of goods.
(1) A buyer in ordinary course o f business
(Subsection (9) o f Section 70A-1-201) other than
a person buying farm products from a person
engaged in farming operations takes free o f a security interest created by his seller even though the
security interest is perfected and even though the
buyer knows of its existence.
- , ^ t•
(2) In the case o f consumer goods, a buyer takes
free o f a security interest even though perfected if
he buys without knowledge o f the security interest,
for value and for his o w n personal, family or household purposes unless prior to the purchase the
secured party has filed a financing statement covering such goods.
(3) A buyer other than a buyer in ordinary course
of business (Subsection (1) o f this section) takes free
of a security interest to the extent that it secures
future advances made after the secured party acquires knowledge o f the purchase, or more than 45
days after the purchase, whichever first occurs,
unless made pursuant t o a commitment entered into
without knowledge o f the purchase and before the
expiration of the 45-day period.
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (1) of this section,
a secured party may not enforce a security interest
in farm products against a buyer, commission merchant, or selling agent who purchases or sells farm
products in the ordinary course of business from or
for a person engaged in farming operations unless
the secured party has complied with the rules issued
by the director of the Division of Corporations and
Commercial Code under authority granted by
Section70A-9-400.
v*
v ~ ; ^ - '-**
70A-M0S. Parcsaat of chattel
A purchaser o f chattel paper o r a n instrument
w h o gives new value and takes possession o f it in
the ordinary course o f his business h a s rjriority «>ver
a security interest in the chattel paper or instrumefit:
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indorsement does not of itself
give notice to subsequent parties
of any defense or claim of the
indorser. Hence this section
gives such an indorsement the
same effect as an unrestricted indorsement.
3. Subsection (2) permits an
intermediary bank (Sections 3—
102(3) and 4—105) or a payor
bank which is not a depositary
bank (Sections 3—102(3) and
4—105) to disregard any restrictive indorsement except that
of the bank's immediate transferor. Such banks ordinarily handle
instruments, especially checks, in
bulk and have no practicable opportunity to consider the effect
of restrictive indorsements. Subsection (2) does not affect the
rights of the restrictive indorser
against parties outside the bank
collection process or against the
first bank in the collection process ; such rights are governed by
subsections (3) and (4) and Section 3—603.
4. Conditional indorsements
are treated by this section like
indorsements for deposit or collection. Under subsection (3)
any transferee under such an indorsement except an intermediary bank becomes a holder for
value to the extent that he acts
consistently with the indorsement in paying or applying any
value given by him for or on the
security of the instrument.
Contrary to the original Section
39, subsection (3) permits a
transferee under a conditional indorsement to become a holder in
due course free of the conditional indorsees claim.
5. Of the indorsements covered by this section those "for collection", "for deposit" and "pay

any bank" are overwhelmingly
the most frequent. Indorsements
"for collection" or "for deposit"
may be either special or blank;
indorsements "pay any bank" are
governed by Section 4—201(2).
Instruments so indorsed are almost invariably destined to be
lodged in a bank for collection.
Subsection (3) requires any
transferee other than an intermediary bank to act consistently
with the purpose of collection,
and Section 3—603 lays down a
similar rule for payors not covered by subsection (2).
6. Subsection (4), applying to
trust indorsements other than
those for deposit or collection
(paragraph (d) of Section 3—
205) is similar to subsection (3);
but in subsection (4) the duty to
act consistently with the indorsement is limited to the first taker
under it. If an instrument is indorsed "Pay T in trust for B" or
"Pay T for B" or "Pay T for account of B" or "Pay T as agent
for B," whether B is the indorser
or a third person, T is of course
subject to liability for any breach
of his obligation as fiduciary.
But trustees commonly and legitimately sell trust assets in transactions entirely outside the bank
collection process; the trustee
therefore has power to negotiate
the instrument and make his
transferee a holder in due course.
Whether transferees from T have
notice of a breach of trust such
as to deny them the status of
holders in due course is governed
by the section on notice to purchasers (Section 3—304); the
trust indorsement does not of itself give such notice. Payors are
immunized either by subsection
(2) of this section or by Section

§ 4—204

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

bank. [This paragraph was added in 1962].
Cross References:
Sections 3—504, 4—501 and 4—
502.

"Documentary draft". Section
4—104.
"Item". Section 4—104.
"Payor bank". Section 4—105.
"Presenting bank".
Section
4—105.

Definitional Cross References:
"Collecting bank". Section 4—
105.

§ 4—205.

Supplying Missing Indorsement; No Notice from
Prior Indorsement
(1) A depositary bank which has taken an item for collection
may supply any indorsement of the customer which is necessary
to title unless the item contains the words "payee's indorsement
required" or the like. In the absence of such a requirement a
statement placed on the item by the depositary bank to the effect
that the item was deposited by a customer or credited to his account is effective as the customer's indorsement.
(2) An intermediary bank, or payor bank which is not a depositary bank, is neither given notice nor otherwise affected by
a restrictive indorsement of any person except the bank's immediate transferor.
Official Comment
Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: None.
Purposes:
1. Subsection (1) is designed
to speed up collections by eliminating any necessity to return to
a non-bank depositor any items
he may have failed to indorse.

<>r
&

2. For the purpose of permitt i n g items to move rapidly
through banking_channels. inter*-.
and payor banks^
media;
which
also depositary
TOTTcs"
permitted to igriorTTe^
strictive indorsements of any person exCgpftlle[bank's immediate"
"transferor. However, depositary
banks may not so ignore restrictive indorsements. If an owner
of an item indorses it "for deposit" or "for collection" he usually does so in the belief such indorsement will guard against
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further negotiation of the item to
a holder in due course by a finder
or a thief. This belief is reasonably justified if at least one bank
in any chain of banks collecting
the item has a responsibility to
act consistently with the indorsement.
Cross References:
Sections 3—205, 3—206, 3—
419, 3—603 and 4—203.
Definitional Cross References:
"Collecting bank."
Section
4—105.
"Customer." Section 4—104.
"Depositary bank".
Section
4—105.
"Intermediary bank." Section
4—105.
"Item." Section 4—104.
"Payor bank." Section 4—105.
"Restrictive
indorsement."
Section 3—205.

§ 3—205
§ 3—205^

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Restrictive Indorsements

"An indorsement is restrictive which either
•i

(a) is conditional; or

"j

(b) purports to prohibit further transfer of the instrument ;
or
(c) includes the words "for collection", "fondeposit", "pay
any bank", or like terms signifying a purpose of deposit or collection; or

(d) otherwise states t h a t it is for the benefit or use of the
i- *M
indorser or of another person.
f

M

-f.

'I

Official Comment
2. This is part of a series of
changes of the prior uniform
statutory provisions effected by
Sections 3—102, 3—205, 3—206,
3—304, 3—419, 3—603, and in
Changes: Combined and rewordArticle 4, Sections 4—203 and
4—205. The purpose of the
ed; new provisions.
changes is generally to require
a taker or payor under restrictive
Purposes of Changes and New
indorsement to apply or pay valMatter:
ue given consistently with the in1. This section is intended to
dorsement, but to provide certain
provide a definition of restrictive
exceptions applying to banks in
indorsements which will include
the collection process (other than
the varieties of indorsement dedepositary banks), and to some
scribed in original Sections 36
other takers and payors.
and 39. The separate mention
of conditional
indorsements,
Cross References:
those prohibiting transfer, inSections 3—102, 3—202(2), 3—
dorsements in the bank deposit
205, 3—206, 3—304, 3—419, 3—
or collection process, and other
603, 4—203 and 4—205.
indorsements to a fiduciary, perDefinitional Cross References:
mits separate treatment in sub"Instrument". Section 3—102.
sequent sections where pdlicy so
"Person". Section 1—201.
requires.
/

Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: Sections 36 and 39, Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law.

§_3—206.
Effect of Restrictive Indorsement
(1) No restrictive indorsement prevents further transfer or
negotiation of the instrument.^
(2) An intermediary bank, or a payor bank which is not the
depositary bank, is neither given notice nor otherwise affected
by a restrictive indorsement of any person except the bank's
immediate transferor or the person presenting for payment.
268
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1

checking account.

2

They had the money and they endorsed the check and

3 they guaranteed these men when they passed that check that the|
4

check didn't have any problems with a restrictive endorsement

5

on it.

6

Bear River State Bank.

7

tive endorsement, and then for them to say, "Nell, the opera-

8

tions officer had no idea we had a thing" doesn't make a

9

difference.

That's what they got when they got that check from
Now, that's the nature of a restric-

They stamp the check.

That's actual notice.

10

Forget about constructive notice with the Secretary of State 1 ^

11

office.

12

These people saw the checks, passed them through

I their bank, got the money for these cattle", and then allowed

13

Mr. Erickson on other checks to draw the money out of the

14

bank.

15

haven't complied with the restrictive endorsement or they

I think that's the end of the case, Your Honor.

They

waived it.
17

THE COURT:

18

MR. DAINES:

In connection—
Your Honor, I just say we're not

19 through presenting evidence at this point.
•
20

THE COURT:

Well, I was going to rule on your

21

motion.
22
23

24
25

MR. DAINES: Okay.
THE COURT: And in connection with the motion, I
see some validity to that and in several areas, some of which
have less validity than others.

One is the measure of proof as to what was con-

1
2

verted if it was converted.

3

for cattle and the endorsement itself says, "In executing my

4

endorsement of this check I do sell to the Smithfield Live-

5

stock Auction the described livestock.11

6

I think you can presume that this was for livestock and was

7

selling livestock, and for a certain amount of money. Whose

8

livestock it was we can assume and I would certainly guess

9

that certainly a portion of it or a good portion of it was

10

probably Mr. Erickson's, but I would be speculating to say

11

that all of the cattle of this amount of money was cattle of

12

Mr. Erickson's upon which there was a lien.

13

that.

14

evidence that certainly part of it was, and maybe a major por-j

15

tion of it was, but I don't know how much.

16

to speculate to come »up with that exact figure.

17

We have checks that have amounts

So that the checks

I don't know

I would have to assume it. There's good circumstantial

So I would have

I also don't understand, when you come up with a

18

figure of $24,919.66, was their shortfall, but that you take

19

9,000 off for what they bid in the land for. That would

20

bring it down to a different figure.

21
22
23
24
25

There's also some questions that arise because this
is a security interest in these cattle and other property,
other personal property, and real property, and there is some
question here as to a bona fideness of the foreclosure and
sale, of which the bank took some credit for and they are not

-JLU /-

1

entitled to all of the cattle if the amount of the cattle

2

exceeds what they're owed.
In other words, they are not the bank's cattle in

3
4

the sense that all of these cattle belonged to the bank.

5

They only have a security interest in them.

6

cattle were still there and they hadn't been sold and they

7

went against the cattle on their security interest on their

8

note and they sold the cattle for twice the amount of what

9

was owed them.

That doesn't mean they get to keep it all,

10

the money.

11

enough to protect their security interest.

12

And suppose the

They'd have to give back—they could only have

Now, I think that relates to the bona fide sale of

13

other security, because they would only be entitled to the

14

amount of their security up to the limit of their debt, and

15 I if they lower what that security is because of sales that
16

I aren't bona fide sales, of course, that does in effect raise

17

the liability for the other security of more than it should

18

be.

19 I
20

21

i n other words, if they had sold all of the persona|

' property, the tractors and the real property and all of that,
and sold it and realized so that there was, say, only 5,000

22

I left, they could only then foreclose on enough cattle to get

23

the remaining five, and when they jeopardize that amount or

24

I make the amount lower than it should be, I think this casts

25

some doubt, at least some doubt, so there should be some

1 estoppel at least as it concerns the amount.
2

But, more important, I think is, first of all,

3 not only do we not know if all the cattle that were sold
4

belonged to* and which checks were made to Mr. Ericksor> were

5

his, but I think the endorsement is important on the back of

6

that check.

7

interpret it as saying, is that Smithfield Livestock Auction,

8

who puts that endorsement on there, is saying, "I am to my

9

bank authorizing them to pay to Mr. Erickson X number of

What that endorsement is saying, or at least I

10 dollars provided he signs the endorsement on the back guaran11 teeing that there are no mortgages and that if there are any
12 mortgages then the release of the person who has the mortgage
13 is required for this check to be any good at all."

I think

14 that's what the restrictive endorsement says.
15

Now, I think this is where the waiver comes in, or

16 I mean the estoppel comes in, is that the bank, Bear River
17 Bank, now successor the plaintiff, takes in the check knowing
1

8 what the restrictive endorsement is and says that this is for

19

a sale of livestock and you are to pay out the money or

20

collect, in this case being the collecting bank, and give the

21

money to Mr. Erickson by placing it in his account, only if

22

the livestock is mortgaged that you have the mortgagee's

23

endorsement on it.

24
25

That's what he's telling them.

Now, they are telling the person who knows they are
mortgaged, and I say that they then, if they give Mr.

1 Erickson the money knowing that they have to put their
2 endorsement on it for there to be any liability on the check
3 by Smithfield Livestock Auction, that they cannot now come and
4 say, "Hey, we want the money for those cattle that were sold."
5 They had every way to get it at the very time they took in the
6 checks.

That is, either refuse to credit the money or sign

7 the endorsement as the mortgagee.

And for that reason I don't

8 think they can now come and say, "Hey, we were ignorant of
9 these checks coming in for payment of cattle and giving
10 Mr. Erickson the money for him to do what he wants with and
11 not protecting ourselves on our mortgage," when they had the
12 mortgage endorsement restrictions on the back of the check,
13
14
15
16

and I think that's the most important p a r t —
MR. DAINES:

Okay.

THE COURT:

— t o g e t h e r with these others, and would

grant the motion.

17
MR. DAINES:

Thank you, Your Honor.

18
MR. SHIELDS:

Your Honor, if I may inquire briefly,

19
what's the court's interpretation of the Section 4-203?
20
That's the concern I have.
21
THE COURT:

Section which one?

22
MR. SHIELDS:
23
24

MR. DAINES:
wants to see it.

70A-4-203.
I'll give it to the court if the court

It's right here, Your Honor.

4-203.

25
THE COURT:

Well, I don't think this has any effect

1 on what I'm saying as to the restrictive endorsement, as to
2 it just being a collecting bank.

If the collecting bank were

3 not given notice by the endorsement itself to themselves as
4

mortgagee.

I'm saying where the restrictive endorsement

5

gives the collecting bank who is taking the money and saying,

6

"Key, I'm giving you this money and will collect it for you

7

and put it in your account," knowing or with constructive

8

notice that they are in fact the mortgagee and know what the

9

restrictive endorsement is.

If they were a collecting bank

10 who didn't have a mortgage on these cattle, I don't think
11 that it w o u l d — I think then 70A-4-203 would apply and they
12 have no liability.
13
14
15

MR. SHIELDS:

So the fact that we held the mortgage

in addition to collecting the checks is the basis of the
court's ruling?

16

THE COURT:

And this gave them the notice and still

17
they gave the money, collected the money and collected it and
18
gave credit to Mr. Erickson for it, with notice of this
19

endorsement and with notice that they have a mortgage on

20
cattle he's selling.

He says cattle right on the endorse-

21
ment.

That's what I think makes the liability, not just

22
simply the fact that they're the collecting bank.
23
MR. SHIELDS:

So my understanding of the court's

24
ruling of no cause of action is based upon the restrictive
25
endorsement.

We've had other assertions, but that's t h e —
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1

THE COURT:

Yeah.

I think 70A-4-203 would protect

2 you if you d i d — i f you were not the mortgagee on what the
3 endorsement says the restriction is for and ignored it.
4

With

notice that this is b e i n g — t h a t money is given out and "We're

5 collecting it to put in your account on the basis of selling
6 our mortgaged property."
7

Nov; how can you come back and say,

"Because at that time we didn't protect ourselves even with

8 notice," and say, "Hey, this is Mr. Erickson, this money is
9 for the sale of cattle we have mortgaged and so we want the
10 money," or something, but to totally ignore it and then wait
11 two or three years later and come back and say, "Hey, we have
12 a shortfall here, we want the money now," is I think where
13 the defect comes in.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Not the fact that they're the collecting]

bank but because of those other three factors that fit in with)
it: notice that if they are mortgaged the mortgagee must
endorse; second, they know they are the mortgagee, and still
then knowing they are the mortgagee on what money is for by
the description of the endorsement itself, still give
Mr. Erickson the money.
They waived, I think, their right to have the money
when they could have collected it at that time.

22
MR. SHIELDS:
23
24

So the court's carving out an excep-

tion to 4-203 if there's a collecting b a n k —
THE COURT:

A particular set of circumstances.

25
MR. DAINES:

Your Honor, I'm uncomfortable having

1

further d e s c r i p t i o n s , because I presume t h a t to allege that

2

you're carving out an exception to 203, I don't think—I

3

think the exception i s in t h e r e .

4

THE COURT:

5

exception.

6

stances—

I don't think I'm carving out an

I think what I'm saying under the present circum-

7

MR. DAINES:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. DAINES: Right.

10
11

— t h i s d o e s n ' t p r o t e c t you.

Z4R. SHIELDS: Because we are the mortgagee in
addition to being the collecting bank?

12
13

That's r i g h t .

THE COURT: And having notice by the endorsement
itself.

14

MR. SHIELDS: That's what I need to know.

15

THE COURT:

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

The language of the endorsement.

Whether you call it a restrictive endorsement or whatever,
although it is, but there's also additional language in the
endorsement as to exactly what's being sold, and if you think
he's selling his cattle, he's told you so in the (endorsement.
MR. DAINES:

Thank you , Your Honor.

I presume I'm

supposed to write the —
THE COURT:

I suspect you want findings of fact and

concl usions of law an d pursuant to the latest decision wi 11
make it at least ten pages.
MR. DAINES:

Yes, Your Honor, ad in finitum.

(Court adjourned at 4:45 p.m.)
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As the Official Reporter for the within-named
Court, I hereby certify the above and foregoing 113 pages to
be a full, true, and correct transcript of all of the proceedings held in the within-named matter on the date indicated therein, to-wit:
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JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS (A 2948)
Attorney for Plaintiff
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK
50 South Main Street, Suite 2011
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0815
Telephone: (801) 535-1054
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, a
Utah banking corporation,

]
>
)
]

Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
Civil No. 23859

SMITHFIELD LIVESTOCK AUCTION,
Defendant.

)

The above captioned matterf having come duly before the Court
for trialf the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersenf Judgef presiding, and
sitting without juryf on the 15th day of October, 1986, at the Cache
County Courthouse, Logan, Utah, and the plaintiff having appeared by
and through counsel, Jeffrey Weston Shields, and the defendant
having appeared by and through counsel, N. George Daines, and the
plaintiff having presented testimony and evidence, and the defendant
having cross-examined the same, and the plaintiff having rested its
case in chief, and the defendant having moved for directed verdict
thereon, and the Court having ruled on said motion for directed
verdict and having made certain findings and conclusions in regard
thereto and being duly advised in the premises, the Court now makes
and enters its;
(•-.j-nber r^3S3>

1^6

/-?$)

SL1H S,filL£N, Clerk 60liK
*»£&
Deputy
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FINDINGS OF FACT AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff Commercial Security Bank is a Utah banking

corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah and doing business in Cache County, State of
Utah.
2.

Plaintiff, Commercial Security Bank, is the successor in

interest to Bear River State Bank, which was merged with Commercial
Security Bank on or about March 31, 1984.
3.

Defendant, Smithfield Livestock Auction, is a Utah

corporation doing business in Cache County, State of Utah and is a
licensed livestock auction agent.
4.

On or about June 8, 1982, William C. Erickson and Susan

S. Erickson (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Ericksons"),
for valuable consideration, executed and delivered to plaintiff a
certain promissory note in the original principal sum of $50,000.00
together with interest accruing as stated therein.
5.

In furtherance of said loan transaction and as security

therefore, Ericksons, on or about June 8, 1982, executed and
delivered to the plaintiff a certain security agreement wherein and
whereby they pledged as security for the note all livestock "now
owned or hereafter acquired", including but not limited to 33
Holstein cows, 67 Holstein heifers, 16 Holstein steers and 13
Holstein calves (hereinafter referred to as the "livestock"), along
with certain other specified items of farm equipment.
6.

As a part of the same loan transaction with the

plaintiff, Ericksons executed and delivered to the plaintiff a
certain U.C.C. 1 Financing Statement to the collateral recited in

6K
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the security agreement, which financing statement was filed with the
office of the Utah Secretary of State on June 23, 1982 as Entry No.
880544.
7.

During all times relevant to this action, the defendant

was conducting a livestock auction and marketing business located in
Cache County, State of Utah.
8.

From at least June 8, 1982 until May 1983, Ericksons kept

and maintained a checking account in their joint names at
plaintiff's predecessorf Bear River State Bankf at Tremontonf Utahf
account number 124301740-57-71917-1.
9.

Between the dates of June 15, 1982 and October 14, 1982,

inclusive, Ericksons consigned certain livestock for sale to
defendant Smithfield Livestock Auction.

Said sales were conducted

on 12 separate occasions and following each sale, the defendant
issued to Erickson its check representing the gross amount of the
proceeds realized from the auction of the livestock on that
particular occasion less a commission of $7.00 per head sold.

All

of said 12 checks issued by the defendant to Erickson bore William
C. Erickson as the sole payee thereon and all were deposited for
collection to the Erickson checking account at Bear River State Bank
by Erickson.

Specifically, the date of the check, the check number,

and amount of the check and the date deposited by Erickson are as
follows:

-3-
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Check Date

Check Number

Amount of Check

Date Deposited

July 1, 1982

16396

$ 1,761.40

July 2, 1982

July 1, 1982

16373

1,336.85

July 2, 1982

July 8 r 1982

16588

381.81

July 15, 1982

16757

1,744.40

-indecipherable-

July 29, 1982

17108

2,544.10

July 30, 1982

August 5, 1982

17217

1,022.34

August 6, 1982

August 5, 1982

17266

979.70

August 6, 1982

August 12, 1982

17430

2,589.10

August 13, 1982

August 22, 1982

17598

1,339.40

August 23, 1982

August 26, 1982

17778

2,189.10

August 26, 1982

September 30, 1982

18620

1,892.56

October 1, 1982

October 14, 1982

18920

3.088.42

October 15, 1982

TOTAL:

9.

July 14, 1982

$2Qr869.18

The 12 above specified checks issued by the defendant to

William C. Erickson contained on the back side thereof the following
printed endorsement instructions: "In executing my endorsement of
this checkf I do sell to the Smithfield Livestock Auction Inc. the
herein described livestock, and I guarantee that I am the owner of
said livestock and that said livestock are clear of any mortgages,
liens or encumbrances.

If livestock are mortgaged, mortgagees

endorsement or release of mortgage is released.

Please endorse

below."
10. Each and every check of the said 12 checks from the
defendant to Erickson bore only the endorsement of William C.

ir;s

BOOK
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Erickson and of no other person or party whatsoverf and all of the
same were collected by plaintiff's predecessor, Bear River State
Bank and no deduction or offset was exercised by Bear River State
Bank against the checking account into which said checks were
deposited and collected.
11. Each of the above specified checks was issued by the
defendant to William C. Erickson within 3 or 4 business days of the
date the livestock sale to which each such check was applicable.
12. During the year 1982f the Smithfield Livestock Auction had
no procedures or methods in place by which to investigate or verify
whether livestock which was brought to it for sale was subject to a
D.C.C. 1 filing on behalf of a secured creditor with the Utah
Secretary of State.
13. During the year 1982, due to its knowledge and experience
in the industry, the defendant assumed as a matter of course that at
least 90% of all livestock brought to it for sale was subject to a
lien or mortgage of some kind.
14. The loan obligation of June 8, 1982 from plaintiff's
predecessor in interest to Ericksons remained in a current and non
delinquent status until April of 1983 at which time it became
delinquent.
15. On May 10, 1983, Ericksons filed a joint petition for
relief under Title 11, United States Code in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, case number 83M-0305.
Plaintiff's predecessor in interest, Bear River State Bank, was
named as a creditor in that proceeding.

Defendant Smithfield

Livestock Auction was not named as a creditor in that proceeding at
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any time.

Ericksons were discharged in bankruptcy under Chapter 7

thereof by order of the United States Bankruptcy Court dated and
entered August 2, 1983.
16. Pursuant to the default of Erickson under the note of June
8 f 1982 and pursuant to the security agreement executed thereon,
plaintiff's predecessor. Bear River State Bank, obtained relief from
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court and exercised against the collateral
pledged thereto by Erickson.

Specifically, plaintiff received a

payment of $1,500.00 from Erickson in consideration of one of two
John Deere Tractors subject to the security agreement which
plaintiff was unable to locate; plaintiff repossessed and sold the
second John Deere Tractor which was the subject of the security
agreement to Golden Spike Equipment Company and realized the sum of
$3,150.00; plaintiff foreclosed the deed of trust on certain
property which was additional security for the loan and bid in at
sale thereof the sum of $9,000.00; and plaintiff was unable to
locate the livestock which was the subject of the security
agreement.
17. Following execution against the above specified collateral,
there was an indebtedness due, owing and unpaid on the June 8, 1982
note in the total sum of $15,919.66 as of March 14, 1984.
18. The defendants have not claimed and did not have at any
time a perfected interest in and to any livestock owned by Erickson.
19. In the livestock industry, the fair market value of
livestock is what said livestock will bring at sale at any
particular time in a regular market therefore and the Smithfield
Livestock Auction is a regular market for livestock such that its

fcCvf 1)5 ;-U G 5
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sale of livestock would reflect the fair market value of the same at
the time and place of sale.
20. Plaintiff filed its Complaint in the instant case on or
about April 28, 1985 claiming that the sale by the defendant of
cattle owned by Erickson and allegedly subject to the security
interest of the plaintiff was an act of conversion entitling the
plaintiff to relief against the defendant in the sum of the fair
market value of the cattle at the time and place of sale.
WHEREFOREf having heretofore made its Findings of Factf and
being duly advised in the premises, the Court now makes and enters
its,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiffs predecessor in interest. Bear River State Bank,

held and possessed a valid security interest in and to all livestock
of William S. Erickson and Susan C. Erickson owned or acquired after
the date of their security agreement, June 8, 1982, the same which
was duly perfected by a U.C.C. 1 Financing Statement filing with the
office of the Secretary of State, State of Utah on June 23, 1982.
2.

The loan obligation of William C. Erickson and Susan S.

Erickson to plaintiff's predecessor in interest, Bear River State
Bank, of June 8, 1982, remained in current status until April of
1983, at which time William C. Erickson and Susan S. Erickson
defaulted thereon.
3.

Plaintiff's predecessor in interest, Bear River State Bank,

executed against security other than the livestock which it could
locate, to wit, one John Deere Tractor, and the real estate which
was the subject of a deed of trust, and collected therefrom
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$9,000.00 on the trust deed foreclosuref $3f150.00 on the one John
Deere Tractor which it took into its possession and $1,500.00
directly from William C. Erickson leaving a delinquent amount in the
sum of $15,919.66.
4.

Defendant sold livestock through its auction between the

dates of June 30, 1982 and October 15, 1982, inclusive, purportedly
belonging to William C. Erickson without actual and formal
permission of the plaintiff's predecessor, Bear River State Bank.
5.

Plaintiff is estopped from asserting its claim of

conversion against

the defendant and has waived its claim of

conversion as the plaintiff was the mortgagee of the cattle which
were sold by the Smithfield Livestock Auction and was in addition
the collecting bank on the said Smithfield Livestock Auction checks
paid to William C. Erickson by virtue of Mr. Erickson's deposit of
those checks into his account at the plaintiff bank, which the
plaintiff bank collected for Mr. Erickson into his account without
exercising a right of set off thereagainst; and further, the
plaintiff is charged with constructive notice of the endorsement
instructions on the back side of each check and knew or should have
known from said endorsement instructions that its loan debtor, Mr.
Erickson, was selling livestock through the Smithfield Livestock
Auction which was subject to its security interest therein and that
said checks, pursuant to said endorsement instructions, required the
endorsement of any mortgage holder and that the payee, William C.
Erickson, guaranteed to the Smithfield Livestock Auction under the
terms of said endorsement instructions that said livestock was free
and clear of any mortgage, lien or interest of any other party.
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Court concludes that the the plaintiff v/as on notice of and bound by
the terms of the endorsement instructions on the back of each of the
Smithfield Livestock Auction checks notwithstanding the provisions
of Utah Code Annotated 70A-4-203, as amended, inasmuch as the
plaintiff was the mortgage holder of the cattle in question in
addition to being the "collecting bank" as provided in said statute
and was therefore on notice of and bound by the endorsement
instructions on said checks.
4.

The Court concludes that such estoppel and waiver is a

defense to a claim of conversion and therefore concludes that the
defendant is entitled to a judgment of dismissal, no cause of
action.
5.

The Court further concludes that neither party has shown

authority for an award of attorney's fees and the same should not be
awarded.
L

h

DATED this

^ H

^

day of November, 1986.
BY THE COURT: . /

Ve No^ C^istdffersen
First District Judge
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
0',i
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t on t h e
/*7~??L
day of
1986, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law to the following:
)

N. George Danes
Attorney for Defendant
128 North Main St.
Logan, Utah 84321

,

•

>

^-,

// ^ A>..7 r/o:y . \U
T:

Deanna D. Sabey
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JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS (A 2948)
Attorney for Plaintiff
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK
50 South Main Street, Suite 2011
Salt Lake Cityr Utah 84130-0815
Telephone: (801) 535-1054
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, a
Utah banking corporation,
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff,

vs.
SMITHFIELD LIVESTOCK AUCTION,

Civil No. 23859

Defendant.

The above captioned matter having come duly before the Court
for trial, the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, Judge, presiding, and
sitting without jury, on the 15th Day of October, 1986, at the Cache
County Courthouse, Logan, Utah, and the plaintiff having appeared by
and through counsel, Jeffrey Weston Shields, and the defendant
having appeared by and through counsel, N. George Daines, and the
plaintiff having presented testimony and evidence, and the defendant
having cross-examined the same, and the plaintiff having rested its
case in chief, and the defendant having moved for directed verdict
thereon, and the Court having ruled thereon and the Court having
herein made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
and being duly informed in the premises, it is now by the Court,

.umber

^X^'V-pCp

VfM7 o T11936

166

btlH % ALLEN, Clerk fcOC
**:.
JUL
Deputy

tiCi

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
That platintiff's Complaint is herewith dismissed with
prejudice, no cause of action.
DATED this

3-^

—'

day of November, 1986.

BY T$Ei .COURT:

VeNtty' Christof f ersen^
First District Judge'

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the
J/TyfO
day of
1986, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment of
Dismissal to the following:
N. George Danes
Attorney for Defendant
128 North Main St.
Logan, Utah 84321

Deanna D. Sabey
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